Most studies of mega-events such as Olympic Games find a relatively small impact on the cities that host them. One reason given for this finding is that the event displaces tourists who otherwise would have come to the city. This paper documents such displacement by showing that expenditure at ski resorts in Colorado rose as a result of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. In addition to supporting previous studies, the spillover effect suggests that cities and states that gain from spillovers might want to supporting bids for events by nearby cities.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, New York failed in its attempt to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games, as London was named the host city. Philadelphia responded to its neighbor's endeavor by submitting its own bid for the 2016 Olympics, which proved even less successful than New York's bid. In this paper, I provide evidence that, rather than imitating New York, Philadelphia would have been better off had it supported New York's bid for the Games.
More generally, I show that the Olympics can have significant spillover effects on surrounding communities if those communities provide amenities that are close substitutes for those found in the host city. Tourists who cannot visit the location of their choice because it is hosting an event, such as the Olympics or a political convention, will look for a reasonable alternative. Nearby cities, states, or regions that provide good substitutes for the host venue can free ride on the event by serving as outlets for otherwise frustrated tourists. A neighboring city or state could increase the opportunity for spillovers by offering logistical or financial assistance to the bidding city.
I provide evidence for this claim by looking at the spillover effects of the 2002 Winter
Olympic Games on the ski tourist industry of neighboring Colorado. Of the sixteen Colorado counties that had ski resorts in 2002, ten experienced an increase in economic activity during the Olympic year. In all, the results show that the Salt Lake City Olympics added $160 million in real net taxable expenditure in these counties.
In the next section of this paper, I discuss the literature concerning public support of sports teams, facilities, and mega-events. In Section III, I develop an empirical model to 
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
The failure of sports teams and facilities to stimulate local economies is by now well known. Starting with the pioneering work by Baade and Dye (1990) , economists have shown repeatedly that sports franchises and facilities have little financial impact on the cities that host them. Coates and Humphreys (2003) build on Baade and Dye's basic model to show that facilities have a limited geographic impact. Others, such as Rosentraub (1997) and Austrian and Rosentraub (1997) , show that new facilities often affect only a narrow segment of the local economy (e.g., restaurants and sports bars) and that the boost they provide is often short-lived.
Several economists have tested whether the same can be said for mega-events. Following Porter (1999) , I define a "mega-event" as any large-scale, organized gathering that draws large numbers of people to a limited geographic area for a relatively short period of time.
Examples of mega-events include the Super Bowl, the quadrennial political conventions, and, of course, the Olympics. Porter's (1999) seminal study found that Super Bowls have no statistically discernible impact on the economies of the host cities. Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2006) iii In the standard model involving three goods, a consumer al
where P i is the price of good i, and M is income. This yields the familiar equilibrium condition that the MRS equals the price ratio.
If x is fixed at x , the consumer maximizes U(y,z) subject to the constraint
is easy to show that, when x is fixed, the amount of y or z that the consumer buys The third time-varying variable is a quarterly dummy. Because many small businesses report the c month at the end of a quarter (March, June, September, or December). To account for the possibility that each month might have a unique impact on economic activity, I also run a specification that discards the quarterly variable and includes eleven dummy variables for each month. November, the month with the lowest level of activity, is the default.
Because the demand for ski vacations is likely to be highly income-elastic, the fourth time-varying control is a measure of the business cycle, the national unemployme iv However, the creation of Broomfield County had no effect on Nederland, and its impact on Boulder County as a whole was negligible.
Neither real retail sales nor any of the independent variables deviated from trend at the time that Broomfield County was formed Because I want to capture specific differences across counties rather than attributing them to a single, fixed county effect, I estimate this equation using a random on the dummy variables relating to the 2002 Olympics (γ i ) will be positive. If counties that had a greater capacity to absorb the spillovers experienced greater economic benefits, the interaction effects ( ) j δ should also be positive.
IV. RESULTS
The results of the random effects regression appear in Table 2 . The specification using ummy variables for December and for the quarterly months appears in the first column.
The specification that includes dummy variables for each month appears in the second urprisingly, the trend coefficient is negative, suggesting declining sales over time. The ation, which steadily rew over the period. As expected, the quarterly dummies and the dummy for December In both columns of Table 2 , the Olympic year has a significant positive impact and the Olympic season has a significant negative impact on economic activity. Both impacts, owever, are at least partly offset by interaction effects. Olympic year interacted with the in each county in the sample. It uses the coefficients from column 2 of Table 2 . 
